To comply with the simplicity principle of the archetypical low-cost carrier (LCC) business model, most LCC do not (yet) offer connecting flights. Nevertheless, due to the overall growth of the sector, more and more transfer opportunities between LCC flights have emerged -albeit mostly as "selfhubbing" under the radar of airlines and airports.
Introduction and objective
Low-cost carriers (LCC) have grown tremendously. The emergence of this business model in Europe was pushed by the introduction of a common air transport market in the late 1990s, and met with many inefficient full service network carriers (FSNC) 1 that felt save at their fortress hubs, and an airport landscape otherwise full of underutilized airports deliberately waiting for traffic. Consequently, the movement share of the LCC sector grew from about 19% in 2006 to 30% in 2015, which translates into some 45k movements in the first week of June (Figure 1 ). Data source: OAG; for airline group definitions see Section 4.
Despite increasingly large networks, connecting flights have not yet been systematically offered by most LCC -in order to avoid increased complexity and cost (Fageda et al, 2015) . In the meantime, however, this categorical rejection of transfer services seems to crumble: Carriers like Norwegian, Vueling or Eurowings are already offering connections at their main bases, and even Ryanair has started a trial phase for transfer services at its Stansted and El Prat bases in summer 2016 (Air Transport World, 2016) . According to Fageda et al (2015) , underlying drivers might be at least threefold: a maturing market with increasingly limited scope for organic growth; capturing travelers that are already doing self-hubbing; and the possibility to offer long(er)-distance ODs. What is more, transferring even between different LCC seems to be on the verge of becoming institutionalized, albeit still niche: be it in form of airport-led transfer schemes or, lately, also by advances in search engine technologies applied by online travel agencies and meta-searchers.
The objective of this paper is to apply a suitable connectivity measure in order to exploratively assess the potential for LCC one-stop connections and airport-pairs in Europe, and to compare this to the FSNC. In other words: We aim at finding out which maximum one-stop network could be generated from the schedules of the LCC sector if transfer opportunities were actively marketed. We apply an SQL-based connectivity query to the OAG schedules database to identify the number of different one-stop airport-pairs and unique connections (frequencies). This exercise is run both for 2015 and 1 We apply the terms "full service network carriers", "network carriers" and the American term "legacy carriers" synonymously. 2006, to get an impression of how the one-stop connectivity provided by these two groups has developed. Given the strong increase in movements, we expect that the LCC sector has been able to increase the number of potential one-stop connections and airport-pairs relatively stronger than the FSNC. An increasingly high (market) potential for indirect LCC services could be of business relevance for several stakeholders like travel distributors, (potential transfer) airports, and the LCC themselves that could benefit from additional demand and higher load factors, reducing the "route density problem" (de Wit and Zuidberg, 2012) .
The idea behind our work builds up on Malighetti et al. (2008) wo found that about 2/3 of the fastest indirect connections in Europe in 2007 were not provided by the alliance system and hence could be exploited by self-hubbing or innovative forms of carrier-independent transfer schemes. This observation confirmed their hypothesis that the "sheer concentration of [LCC] flights can provide room for indirect connectivity" (Malighetti et al., 2008, p. 54) . This aspect shall be even more relevant nowadays.
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 provides an overview of connectivity indicators and Section 3 of the evolution of low-cost transfer offerings and self-hubbing trends in Europe. In Chapter 4, we introduce our dataset, main assumptions and definitions, as well as the actual modelling approach. The results for the years 2015 and the comparison year 2006 are presented in section 5. Section 6 concludes with some additional remarks e.g. on operational and commercial restrictions that shall be overcome to successfully implement a LCC interlining network, as well as ideas for future research. This includes the questions of liability for missed connections, and of baggage through handling.
Air transport connectivity and its measurement
To generate economies of scale, density and scope and hence to offer competitive fares, most airlines consolidate their supply in offering fixed networks of pre-defined routes and frequencies, which translates into a certain level of connectivity. Archetypical network types that are applied by air transport providers are point-to-point networks, where less focus is put on connecting traffic, and hub&spoke networks, in which all or most of the routes start or end at certain nodes where connections are provided (see e.g. Berechman and de Wit, 1996 , Berechman et al, 1998 , and Burghouwt and de Wit, 2005 .
Connectivity is, however, a rather abstract term for which several different measures and indicators have emerged.Connectivity measures usually refer to either a certain location or to a whole network, and are hence applied to centrality-and accessibility-related questions such as "How well is airport A connected with e.g. the rest of the world?", "How many connections are offered in the network of airline X or region Y?", or "What is the centrality / hub potential of airport H?".
An early connectivity indicator was developed by IATA (Smyth and Pearce, 2007) . It aims at quantifying the degree to which an airport (or e.g. a city, region or country through several airports) is integrated within the global air transport network and considers the number and size of the destinations as well as the seat capacities and frequencies on each route. The indicator is relatively easy to handle but neglects the additional benefit stemming from flights to hubs where connecting services are offered.
A connectivity indicator that aims at overcoming this lack of indirect connectivity value is the "Airport Connectivity Index" developed by Dutch SEO Economisch Onderzoek. It measures the number of direct and indirect frequencies from an airport, weighted by a quality factor which represents the fastness of the connection. It can be calculated using the Netscan Connectivity Model which has been applied in various studies, e.g. ACI (2014) . Other indicators that consider indirect connectivity include the "Doganis and Dennis" (Doganis and Dennis, 1989; Dennis, 1994) , "Bootsma" (Bootsma, 1997) and "WNX" (weighted number of connections; Burghouwt, 2007) indicators. Unlike the IATA indicator, these indicators do however not consider capacities and hence may underestimate the actual value of routes served with larger than average aircraft which c. p. provide more capacity (at possibly more attractive fares).
In an attempt to model not only the value of non-and one-stop connections, Malighetti et al (2008) have introduced a connectivity index based on the shortest path length. To compare the connectivity of e.g. different airports or regions, the averages of the minimum path lengths between each airport and all other airports in the network are estimated. The authors also introduced a new measure named "Essential Betweenness" which describes to what extend an airport is "unavoidable" on minimal paths. In one of the later papers, Niesse and Grimme (2015) have added the dimensions travel time and frequencies to the shortest path length approach. They present two new indicators, "average shortest travel time (ASTT)" and "average highest path velocity (AHPV)", which consider the shortest travel time depending on the time of departure, hence merging both frequencies and travel time into one indicator value. Generally, it is however questionable to what extent a multi-, say 3-, 4 or 5-stop, connection shall (still) be counted and hence regarded as beneficial for a location.
An empirically founded connectivity metric was introduced by Allroggen et al (2015) . It is the first model to consider the quality and quantity of non-and one-stop connections -as already introduced by Burghouwt and de Wit (2005) -from the passengers' empirical perspective instead of generic assumptions for e.g. maximum detours.
A comprehensive overview over some of these and other connectivity indicators was provided by Burghouwt and Redondi (2013) who identified a high correlation between most of the indicators.
In this paper, we aim at assessing the indirect connectivity potential of the European low-cost carrier network, compared to that of the network carriers. Hence, we apply a connectivity measure at the total network level, and here focus on indirect one-stop connections.
Towards connections between low -cost carriers
Low-cost air travel has been a hot topic in research, policy and practice since the US (1978) and European (1997) market deregulation. Work that deals with the architecture of the archetypical LCC business model include e.g. Lawton (2002) and Forsyth (2003) . To operate at the lowest possible costs, the "pure" LCC employs a standardized fleet of single-class aircraft on point-to-point routes under a simple, one-way based pricing scheme from smaller airports. It further avoids frills from free catering over lounge access to frequent flyer schemes, and distributes directly to save CRS fees.
This approach turned out to be successful: Dobruszkes (2013) Lately, many LCC have changed their business models into more hybrid ones, introducing elements known from the network carriers. Papers that deal with this evolution of the LCC business model include Francis et al (2007) , Mason and Morrison (2008) and Fageda et al (2015) . Klophaus et al (2012) group those airlines that are widely perceived as LCC within an index based on the individual fulfillment of a list of archetypical "LCC criteria". They find that only 5 of 20 European carriers, led by Ryanair and Wizz Air, could actually still be labelled as pure LCC, while the others are rather part of the groups "hybrid carriers with dominant LCC characteristics", "hybrid carriers with dominant full service airline characteristics" and "full service airlines". Lohmann and Koo (2013) perform a similar study for a sample of nine US carriers. They show that, due to hybridization, airlines can no longer be easily attributed to pre-defined, discrete groups. Instead, there is now a continuum of different business models in play.
One of the first papers to tackle the issue of connections between LCC is Malighetti et al (2008) . The authors found that about two thirds of the fastest indirect connections within Europe in 2007 were not operated by the alliance system and might hence be exploited by new forms of e.g. self-hubbing. Grimme (2008) had a more disaggregated look at the actual implementation of the first airport-led LCC transfer schemes (viaberlin.com and cologne-bonn-connect.com) that had appeared some 10 years ago. On the one hand, he sees some benefits, such as the possibility to offer airport-pairs not yet served directly or indirectly by any network carrier, which might help generating some new demand, and -from the airport's perspective -additional aviation and non-aviation revenue. On the other hand, the author identified two major obstacles for success, the "unidirectionality" and "awareness" problems:
• In many cases, good LCC connections via a particular airport can only be generated for either the outbound or the inbound trip, due to the unidirectionality of routes that are only served once per day or even less often; • The target group -wishing to fly from O to D -will usually not be aware of a booking platform made available on the website of a potential intermediate airport H. Or -to give an example: How should someone wishing to travel from Pisa to Gdansk come up with the idea of searching for a suitable flight on the website of Cologne/Bonn airport?
As figure 1 showed, both LCC supply and market share rose strongly in the last years, with the sector now accounting for about 30% of all intra-European flights. We assume that this sheer growth alone may have brought the LCC network closer to suitability for connecting services.
Furthermore, LCC usually price their flights on a one-way basis, i.e. no fare penalties occur if only a one-way segment is booked and not a round trip. This shall make combinations of different LCC legs more affordable than itineraries which would include one-way segments of legacy carriers. This is because the latter usually charge high fares for one-ways and for returns with short stays, while they usually discount return fares provided that e.g. the so-called "Saturday night rule" is met. This way, they aim at establishing so-called rate fences between inexpensive fares targeted at leisure travelers (who usually want to stay over the weekend) and more expensive tickets for business travelers (who usually prefer mid-week day returns) (Bischoff et al, 2011) .
Also, the combination of different low-cost flights is increasingly facilitated by recent developments in the travel distribution industry: Meta-search engines and online travel agents have grown in importance and proven to be capable of instantly combining different travel products. Some new players, such as Kiwi.com (see screenshot in Figure 2 for a "Ryanair-on-Norwegian" connection from Cologne/Bonn to Oslo via Berlin), already combine flights from different LCC and even provide the traveler with a connection guarantee (insurance). If, as long as no baggage through check is provided, no additional production costs occur at the airline level, additional transfer passengers generated this way could be attractive for LCC in terms of increasing economies of density. Finally, connections offered on LCC would tend to supply a larger number of seats per movement (and OD). This is because LCC operate large 150-190 seater aircraft while network carriers usually provide smaller capacities on continental flights, of which, moreover, large shares are effectively "blocked" for passengers transferring to or from long haul flights. In times of increasing hybridization it is not trivial to group carriers by their business model. In fact, Mason and Morrison (2008) state that a range of somehow "low-cost" business models now coexist. We define all carriers as LCC that meet all or most of the following "LCC criteria" that are repeatedly named in the literature 3 : only one service class on intra-European flights; simple, one-way-based pricing model; LCC-style, low-fare focused PR; homogenous fleet of large narrow-body aircraft; focus on intra-European flights; no alliance membership (see Figure 3 ). Most "leisure" carriers, in the past often labelled as "charter airlines", have been attributed to the group of LCC as these business models have converged massively. German airberlin was part of the LCC group in 2006 but is now assigned to the FSNC group as it operates a hub&spoke network in close cooperation with Etihad Airways and Oneworld partners (Figure 4) . Furthermore, the carrier offers free snacks and drinks on all flights, and a FFP operating under the Oneworld scheme. Aer Lingus, in contrast, had left Oneworld in 2007 and switched to a low-cost business model. The carrier is hence assigned to the LCC group for our 2015 assessment, although it may soon re-switch groups following its acquisition by IAG and re-joining of Oneworld in 2016. Some carriers are not considered as part of either of these two groups, for example regional airlines and those airlines operating hubs at very remote places (e.g. Turkey). To keep computing times at reasonable levels, we apply a connectivity indicator that counts only one-and not two-or more-stop connections. This restriction will not distort the overall picture as the latter two are virtually unknown within Europe (see Figure 5) . What is more, we do not consider nonstop connectivity as the objective of this paper is to have an exclusive look at indirect connectivity contribution of the LCC. We only consider connecting times between 45 minutes and 4 hours as shorter connections are hardly operational and longer waiting will hardly be marketable. For reasons of simplicity, theminimum connecting time of 45 minutes has been set as fix for all airports, although -in realitythere are airports with multiple terminals between which real connecting times will easily exceed this 93.1% 6.6% 0.3%
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frontier. We are aware that 45 minutes might, in practice, be too quick for baggage through check between carriers. However, we stick to this lower limit as more and more passengers within Europe seem to travel with hand-luggage only.
Furthermore, our modelling approach only considers the first connecting flight for a given first segment to each destination, to avoid double-counting of connections with the same first and more than one possible onward segments ( Figure 6 ). Also, connections are only counted if they exist at least once weekly in both directions (as we assume that the majority of travelers will want to come back!) and if the detour factor is below 150%. Finally, within the two groups (LCC versus FSNC), all fights of all carriers may be combined. Our assumptions are summarized in the following table: The INNER JOIN keyword selects all rows from both tables as long as there is a match between the columns in both tables. Hence, for each flight's destination, the algorithm tried to identify onward routes whose departure airport equals the first segment's destination airport, considering the restrictions such as the 150% and 45min-4hrs rules. The resulting one-stop table contains all possible connecting flights taking into account these constraints. To reduce the size of the datasets, some of these restrictions (e.g. the selection of the carrier groups) were applied to the original OAG dataset, resulting in two different datasets "Leg" and "LCC" that were handled independently of each other. 
Most important transfer airports
In a next step, we aim at identifying those airports that account for the highest shares in potential transfer connections. For this, we group the list of O i D j via H k connections by the intermediate H k airports. Table 2 shows the most important transfer points (hubs) for low-cost, one-stop connections for the years 2006 and 2015, and the cumulative number of connections via these airports. Today, the most important transfer point for one-stop connections between LCC is Barcelona, accounting for about 27.3k unique, weekly connections (17% "market share). This is a big jump from the 1.2k connections ( Other airports that could massively increase the number of LCC connections include Dublin (partly due to the swap of Aer Lingus from the FSNC to the LCC group), Oslo (where Norwegian has massively grown), Rome Fiumicino (where the "big three", Ryanair, easyJet and Vueling, have grown strongly) and Dusseldorf (where Lufthansa has handed over most of its traffic to germanwings and Eurowings). What is more, the cumulative shares show that the connecting opportunities with LCC are now distributed a bit wider within the airport landscape than in 2006.
For comparison reasons, we also have a look at the most important transfer points for connections between network carrier flights (Table 3) . Here, the biggest "winners" within the TOP 25 are We assume that especially those routes with high one-stop supply but low numbers of direct flights could provide good business opportunities for one-stop offerings. This might e.g. apply to ODs such as from Barcelona to East Midlands, Edinburgh, Glasgow, Leeds/Bradford, Catania and Belfast, from Mahon, Stuttgart and Hamburg to Dublin, or from Dublin to Ibiza, Milan Malpensa and Geneva, which all end up among the largest 100 airport-pairs in terms of weekly one-stop connections between LCC and at the same time contested by a maximum of 10 direct flights per week only. The identified potential for one-stop, low-cost connections will, however, only provide benefits for the stakeholders if eventually translated into actual bookings. Some airlines (like Vueling, Norwegian and Eurowings) have already started to sell connecting flights, and even Ryanair started a trial phase at two selected airports in summer 2016. Nevertheless, a LCC transfer scheme across all carriers would be needed to fully exploit the identified potential.
Based on the (scarce) literature and feedback from stakeholder talks, we close the paper in discussing some operational issues regarding the implementation of a successful low-cost connect regime:
• Given the "unidirectionality" and "awareness" problems" of any low-cost-connect scheme at the airport level only, the most promising operator of such tools would have to come from the travel distribution and search engine sectors. It can hence be expected that other ventures will follow the footsteps of Kiwi.com and the likes.
• The missed connection problem is not supposed to make a major obstacle as liability can be -and is -absorbed by insurance premiums. The "early birds" viaberlin and cologne-bonnconnect charged insurance fees of about 7.5-8 € per connection and passenger, which would cover about 450-500€ of additional rebooking costs if a connection is missed, and if necessary, expenses for hotel accommodation up to certain limits (Grimme, 2008) . The offers on Kiwi.com also include a mandatory insurance component.
• The "baggage and through-check" problem does not only occur at the (potential) transfer airports (not all airports with a large number of LCC services are experienced in baggage transfers) but is also of relevance at the trip origins where the check-in systems (as currently in operation by many LCC) do not always have access on the onward flight, which might even be performed by a different carrier. Solutions at the IATA level -e.g. in the context of IATA's Travel Information Manual (TIM) -might be an option here, although many LCC are (not yet) members of IATA.
If these remaining issues were solved, many stakeholders could benefit from increased LCC connection possibilities. Low-cost carriers could increase their economies of density; passengers would find more choice, more competition and lower fares on indirect routes; and even legacy carriers could possibly benefit if they relied on LCC as feeders and concentrated on more profitable long hauls instead, as suggested e.g. by Ryanair and easyJet (Financial Times, 2016) . In addition, high one-stop demand may be an indicator for routes that should potentially become non-stop (Grimme, 2008) .
Finally, airports (and here not only the established hubs) could benefit from higher aviation and nonaviation revenues (Grimme, 2008) , and from increased slot productivity if conventional feeder flights are -in the long run -replaced by LCC services operated by larger aircraft. In this regard, we support the argumentation of Fageda et al (2015) that the hybridization of the LCC business model will require airports to leave well-worn paths: Traditional non-hub, low-cost airports will have to find solutions how to ensure smart connections between LCC services, while established airports that so far mainly worked with legacies will have to evaluate how they can establish connections between LCC, that may even be split over different terminals. An important step was taken by Dusseldorf airport where the introduction of new air-side pathways between the three terminal areas A, B and C now allows for air-side connections also between the different airline groups.
We close this paper in providing some ideas for further research. Apart from a more detailed look at the technical and operational feasibility of LCC transfers, and possible solutions, the quantitative approach as presented in this paper should be enhanced in (a) considering online and code-share connections between FSNC only (currently, we also consider inter-alliance transfers, which are unlikely to be available at attractive fares) and (b) implementing more realistic, airport-specific minimum connecting times depending from actual airport and terminal layouts. Furthermore, it will be interesting to translate the identified connections in actual market potentials. 
